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1. Introduction
 The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has emerged as an incredibly influential actor in Africa 
during the past fifteen years. Although China has been active on the continent for over fifty years, the 
state’s interaction in Africa took a business-focused and ideologically-divorced direction in the 
mid-1990s. This reorientation complemented the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) domestic policies 
aimed at transitioning to a market economy and opening up to the forces of globalization. Chinese leaders 
view Africa as a land of potential, actively courting political relationships and business ventures across 
the continent. The Chinese government regards Africa as critical to its national interests and consequently 
considers positive relations with African states a foreign policy priority. 
 The PRC uses its developmental success as a marketing tool to attract African leaders and 
promote increased Sino-African relations. As embodied in the China-Africa policy, the PRC asserts that 
Chinese engagement will support both African and Chinese development goals. By sharing the wisdom of 
Beijing’s development strategies, Chinese officials proclaim that African countries can reach their 
development potential and integrate into the world economy. This political rhetoric is supported by 
tangible development assistance such as zero-tariff trade arrangements, debt-relief, investment, 
professional development and capacity-building measures. 
 While Chinese engagement does offer positive prospects for Africa’s development, the effects of 
China’s development strategies have not been wholly beneficial within China. China’s thirty years of 
rapid development have led to serious structural problems within Chinese society. The CCP designed their 
development strategies with a singular focus on economic growth. These growth-above-all strategies have 
transformed the once egalitarian nation into a highly polarized and unequal society. China’s development 
comes with high-costs such as labor exploitation, environmental degradation, unprecedented inequality, 
flagrant corruption and a loss of social welfare. Domestically, the Chinese government has been too slow 
to implement and enforce regulation addressing these concerns for fear that it will slow economic growth. 
This fear is partly derived from the developmental attitudes, often referred to as developmentalism, which 
permeate Chinese society. The pursuit of wealth has become a value that influences the actions of the 
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state, Chinese businesses and individuals. Thus, Chinese actors in Africa operate through the lens of their 
developmental attitudes and experiences. The PRC does not simply offer African states a development 
strategy. In many cases, Chinese engagement is an externalization China’s entire development experience.
  Chinese engagement is further complicated by China’s national interests. In particular, the 
acquisition of Africa’s natural resources often determine Chinese engagement modalities. In order to 
continue on China’s development trajectory, the country requires a substantial supply of natural resources. 
Although the PRC genuinely aspires to maintain a positive reputation abroad and to assist developing 
states in meeting their development goals, concerns about national interests often trump these desires. Just 
as the state has been too slow to implement and enforce regulation domestically, the state has been too 
slow to regulate its actors abroad for fear it will impede the fulfillment of their national interests.   
 This does not bode well for African development. African states cannot afford the externalities 
that have come with China’s rapid development. Africa is already plagued by food insecurity, 
environmental degradation, societal instability, disease and corruption. However, many states cannot 
afford, nor do they desire, to end engagement with China. Chinese actors are providing unprecedented 
development opportunities throughout the continent. Therefore, African leaders throughout society must 
maintain an active role in shaping Chinese engagement. 
 With a full understanding of the impact of China’s development strategies domestically, African 
leaders can design policies and strategies that support Sino-African cooperation while mitigating the 
developmental externalities which currently plague Chinese society. In this active role, African leaders 
can rebalance Sino-African relations and realize the win-win outcomes which the Chinese government 
espouses. This will help African states achieve a comprehensive level of development and integration into 
the world economy. 
2. Understanding Chinese Engagement in Africa
 Sino-African relations have grown considerably since the mid-1990s. Chinese politicians describe 
the relationship as a “constructive and strategic partnership of cooperation for mutual benefit and 
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common development.”1 According to them, the relationship is based on the “principle of sincerity, 
friendliness, equality, mutual benefit, solidarity, cooperation and development.”2 Officials state that as the 
largest developing country and the largest group of developing countries, China and Africa share common 
perspectives and interests, making them natural partners in the international community.3 Leaders 
emphasize the development potential of Africa, citing recent economic growth and increased stability. Du 
Xiaocong of the Chinese Permanent Mission to the United Nations stated in 2010, “China is convinced 
that the potential of Africa will offer space for the future development of the whole world and China as 
well.”4 
 Chinese activities in Africa support the CCP’s political discourse. Foreign Ministers make the 
most high-level visits to Africa out of anywhere in the world.5 While in 2000, Sino-African trade volume 
was just US$10 billion, in 2011, China-Africa trade volume reached US$160 billion. This indicates a 
year-to-year average trade growth of thirty percent.6  With more than 2,000 Chinese enterprises in Africa, 
the continent receives considerable foreign direct investment (FDI). For instance, Chinese official FDI 
flows to Africa between 2007-2010 averaged $1.5 billion per year.7 The PRC also supports numerous 
capacity building efforts and provides concessional loans for infrastructure projects. The Chinese 
government is deeply invested in Africa, ensuring a substantial and long-term relationship. 
Chinese National Interests 
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http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Deborah_Brautigam_Testimony.pdf.
 While Chinese leaders emphasize that their presence in Africa is based on mutual benefit and 
win-win development, China’s engagement is also driven by national interests. Several reasons exist for 
China’s rapid engagement in Africa. Natural resources, though not the sole reason for the Chinese 
presence in Africa, are a critical reason for China’s activity throughout the continent. John Rocha, a 
Senior Project Manager for NEPAD Business Foundation, writes, “The fact is China needs Africa as 
much as Africa needs China. China needs raw materials from Africa and elsewhere to sustain its growing 
economy.”8 Natural resources like oil, cobalt, lumber, diamonds, iron ore and copper are critical for 
China’s short, medium and long-term growth. Currently, about thirty percent of Chinese oil is exported 
from Africa.9 Chinese demand is forecast to more than double to 14.2 million barrels per day by 2025, 
making positive relationships with oil-producing nations like Angola and Nigeria critical for Chinese 
development.10 
 China also cultivates relations with African states to garner support in multilateral forums. 
African support is seen as a means to establish a new international order void of Western domination.11  
Close relationships with African states serve to equalize power relations between the North and South in 
these forums. As the self-appointed leader of the developing world, this increases China’s share of power 
internationally and advances their national interests. 
 Chinese politicians and business leaders recognize the economic opportunity Africa offers as 
well. Considering much of Africa’s recent growth and increasing disposable income, the region is an 
attractive location for Chinese companies to export goods and gain international business experience. 
Although investment may initially be risky in some markets, Chinese officials and companies are willing 
to accept risk in exchange for long-term economic integration.
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Herman, and Johanna Jansson (2008), http://www.ccs.org.za/downloads/CCS_-_New_Impulses_from_the_South_-
_May_08.pdf.
9 Alex Vines, “China in Africa: A Mixed Blessing?” Current History, (2007): 214, http://www.relooney.info/
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11 Joseph Y. S. Cheng, “China’s Foreign Policy after the 17th party congress,” in Dancing with the Dragon” China’s 
Emergence in the Developing World, ed. Baogang Guo and Dennis Hickey (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 
2010): 35.
 Lastly, the CCP engages African states to stymie official recognition of Taiwan.12 The singular 
conditionality imposed on African governments is that they end diplomatic relations with Taiwan and 
recognize the One-China Principle. The principle asserts that the PRC is the rightful and singular Chinese 
government. With only 4 out of 54 African states maintaining formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan 
(Burkina Faso, Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, and Swaziland), the PRC has been very successful.13
 The above information highlights the complications associated with Chinese engagement in 
Africa. On one hand, China desperately desires to be viewed as a responsible leader of the developing 
world. Engagement is considered a means to support African development. This stimulates African 
political support of the PRC and increases the overall power of the developing world within the 
international community. On the other hand, engagement is a pragmatic means to obtain natural resources 
and integrate into foreign markets, both of which are critical for sustaining China’s economy and 
continual development. While the Chinese government strives to make these interests complementary, in 
practice, they are sometimes contradictory.
Pertinent Policies
 China’s pragmatic approach to Africa was initially spurred by China’s “Going Global” policy in 
2001. The policy aims to move Chinese investment and enterprises overseas. The policy promotes 
Chinese firms to “invest overseas, establish factories and buy property.”14 One goal of the policy is to 
promote brand recognition for China’s most successful companies, coined “Dragon Heads.”15 This 
includes Lenovo, Haier, and Huawei. The policy also hopes to improve the operations of other Chinese 
companies, forcing them to compete with foreign firms and gain international business acumen. The PRC 
supports overseas business activity through a number of means, including preferential loans, export 
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13 “Political Status of Taiwan,” Wikipedia, last updated March 23, 2012, accessed March 25, 2012, http://
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14 Deborah, Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 74. 
15 Ibid.
sellers credits and SEZs. The policy was especially significant in supporting initial business ventures in 
Africa.16 
 In addition to China’s “Going Global” policy, the 2006 China-Africa policy is critical to 
understanding Chinese engagement. The policy describes Sino-African relations as a strategic partnership 
based on mutual benefit and common development.The policy emphasizes that as developing countries, 
China-Africa relations promote mutual interests. It advocates for enhanced cooperation in a wide array of 
areas such as foreign policy, trade, education, culture, health, science, technology and military endeavors. 
Throughout the policy, references to mutual experiences of exploitation provide a contrast between 
Chinese engagement and that of Western powers.17 The policy was published both to challenge claims of 
Chinese exploitation and to signal to African leaders a desire for increased cooperation. 
  China’s policy of noninterference is also important for understanding Sino-African relations. 
This policy is derived from Beijing’s “Five Principles of Peaceful Existence,” which were established in 
1955 at the famous Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung, Indonesia. The ideas produced at the conference 
became influential in the non-aligned movement and remain influential in Chinese foreign policy. The 
principals include: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; 
noninterference in the internal affairs of other states; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful 
coexistence.18 China’s policy of noninterference is attractive in Africa, where the memory of colonialism 
and foreign exploitation remains deeply entrenched in the national fabric of many states. The policy of 
noninterference is central to China’s foreign policy and greatly shapes the behavior of the Chinese State in 
Africa.
Modalities for Engagement
 The multilateral mechanism for China-Africa relations is the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC). Following in the legacy of the 1955 Bandung Conference, the forum is seen to promote a non-
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aligned and multilateral worldview.19 However, the emphasis at the forum is far more on practical 
engagement rather than political dialogue. The forum provides avenues for public and private leaders to 
build relationships through ministerial conferences, senior official meetings and entrepreneurs’ 
conferences.20 During the 2006 summit in Beijing, President Hu Jintao announced eight points to 
strengthen China-Africa partnership. These points included providing more aid, canceling debts, waiving 
duties, creating economic and trading cooperation districts, training professionals, building agricultural 
centers and building schools. Incredibly, before the next forum, all the measures listed by Hu were being 
implemented, a marked change from the many unfulfilled development promises of Western states. When 
looking at the agreements reached and fulfilled through the FOCAC, it is impossible to argue that the 
Chinese State is disinterested in African development. 
! The Chinese State uses a variety of mechanisms to finance Chinese engagement. According to 
Deborah Brautigam, an expert on Chinese development assistance in Africa, the instruments of PRC 
finance considered official development assistance include grants, zero-interest loans, debt-relief and 
concessional loans. Non-aid forms of financing include preferential export credits, market-rate export 
buyers credits and commercial loans from Chinese banks. China also maintains equity funds to 
support Chinese companies in Africa.21 Highlighting the influence of its own development 
experience, many of these financing arrangements were offered to China when it was a development 
assistance recipient. 
 Among influential government bodies, China Eximbank maintains a central role in facilitating 
Chinese engagement in Africa. Eximbank, the largest import-export bank in the world, promotes 
Chinese exports and investment, providing access to export credit, international guarantees and loans 
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for overseas investment. 22 The bank also provides Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) a 
competitive advantage abroad. With Eximbank support, SOEs operate on slim profit margins and 
engage in projects considered too risky by other companies. Seventy-nine percent of Eximbank loans 
in Africa are given to Chinese SOEs for infrastructure projects.23 Through the policy bank, the 
Chinese State influences the operations of SOEs abroad and promotes its national interests.
  While the FOCAC is an important multilateral mechanism, the majority of Sino-African 
engagement occurs on a bilateral basis. Over the past decade, Chinese diplomats have developed a pattern 
for engaging African governments. Once an African government ends relations with Taiwan, 
representatives of both states hold a series of meetings to identify each party’s interests and goals. These 
meetings result in a package deal reflecting the interests of both states. The deals include Chinese support 
in the form of debt cancelation, grants, loans and technology-transfer. Often, concessional loans are 
offered for the construction of infrastructure and political-prestige projects. For example, Chinese firms 
have built ports, roads, stadiums, hydropower plants and hospitals as a result of these deals. In exchange 
for this support, the African State typically provides China access to its extractive industries. The package 
deals include tied aid, requiring seventy percent of contracts to be awarded to Chinese firms and fifty 
percent of materials to originate from China.24 These arrangements are similar to those China engaged in 
with Japan and other donors during the late 20th century. They are viewed by the Chinese State as a 
pragmatic means for each party to meet their development goals. 
 Considering the above information, it is understandable why many African leaders find Chinese 
engagement so attractive. Across Africa, leaders are hailing China’s development model as the long-
awaited answer to their development needs. While preparing for South Africa’s recent State of the Nation 
address, Enoch Godongwana, head of the ANC's economic transformation committee, stated, "The 
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Chinese model of building infrastructure and growing jobs will be a key focus of the ANC's economic 
policy."25 Zimbabwean leader Robert Mugabe has implemented a “Look East” policy aimed at reorienting 
the country’s foreign and economic policy towards the east, primarily China. In 2005, Mugabe stated, "It 
is very important for us...to develop the Look East Policy because that is where people who think like us 
are, same history of colonialism as ourselves, people who have started developing their economies."26 In a 
now famous editorial to the Financial Times, Senegal’s former President Abdoulaye Wade argued that the 
West has much to learn from China: 
China’s approach to our needs is simply better adapted than the slow and sometimes patronizing 
post-colonial approach of European investors, donor organizations and non-governmental 
organizations. In fact, the Chinese model for stimulating rapid economic development has much to 
teach Africa...the Chinese are more competitive, less bureaucratic and more adept at business in 
Africa.27 
The above quotes are just a small sample of statements by African leaders supporting Chinese activity in 
Africa. The Chinese approach, with its focus on economic cooperation, nonintervention and capacity 
building, resonates with many African leaders. The Chinese government has been very successful at 
marketing its development strategies in Africa. 
3. Literature Review  
 A cacophony of scholarly voices abound regarding Chinese engagement in Africa. While a wealth 
of literature exists on this subject, scholars conclusions about Chinese engagement span the spectrum 
from criticism of China as Africa’s new colonizer, to praises for providing Africa’s development answer. 
It appears that location and academic background influence opinions on the Chinese presence in Africa. 
Discourse from Western scholars tends to carry a more critical tone, whereas scholars located in China 
often shed a positive light on engagement. African scholars are the most heterogeneous group, reflecting a 
general uncertainty among Africans about the impact of Chinese engagement.
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   Klare and Chan-Fishel, scholars focused on environmental issues, both identify problems with 
Chinese activities. Klare notes that the majority of Chinese engagement focuses on resource-rich states, 
regardless of the internal situation or ruling government. He points out that China regularly supplies arms 
and military training to states like Sudan, Nigeria and the DRC in exchange for resources. For Klare, 
destruction of the environment and support for infamous governments renders Chinese engagement in 
Africa dangerous.28 Michelle Chan-Fishel, who focuses on environmental degradation in the mining, 
timber, oil and gas industries, asserts that, “The low-price development model actually comes at a very 
high cost - to societies, both inside and outside China, as well as the environment.”29 Coming from an 
environmental standpoint, these scholars are highly critical of China’s activities in Africa.
 Similarly critical, Eisenman and Kurlantzick highlight Chinese military cooperation, support for 
unsavory regimes, poor standards of corporate governance and unequal trade relationships, concluding 
that, “Chinese influence could complicate democratic consolidation and good governance...[China] could 
undermine years of international efforts to link aid to better governance.” The authors also emphasize the 
inequality Chinese engagement perpetuates but supporting some in society more than others.30  Ali 
Askouri, a human rights advocate, is more critical, stating, “There is no doubt Chinese economic 
assistance is encouraging dictatorships and tyranny in Sudan, Chad, Zimbabwe and elsewhere.” For 
Askouri, Chinese leaders serve as accomplices to corrupt African leaders, leaving them implicit in human 
rights abuses.31 For those focused on human rights, Chinese engagement is conveyed as a threat to 
African and international actors promoting democratic values and good governance. However, these 
scholars often focus on Chinese relationships with more sensationalist African regimes’ and fail to 
recognize possible benefits of engagement in other states. While these scholars correctly identify 
detrimental consequences of Chinese engagement, they fail to recognize the connection between China’s 
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development process and African engagement. They also take too extreme of positions, focusing on the 
negative aspects of Chinese engagement with little recognition of how China’s activities can benefit 
African development. 
 Conversely, many Chinese scholars cast a positive light upon engagement. They focus on 
perceived economic benefits, developing-nation partnership (often referred to as South-South 
cooperation) and the lack of colonial history between China and Africa. Jing Men highlights the benefits 
of Chinese trade, debt relief and unconditional economic aid. He emphasizes that many conditional 
measures tied to Western development assistance strangled African development and perpetuated 
asymmetric donor-recipient relationships. For Men, China offers Africa an attractive partnership of 
equals, provides economic opportunities and increases African political leverage internationally.32 Barry 
Sautman and Yan Hairong, based in Hong Kong, are also positive. They highlight the numerous benefits 
of Chinese engagement: cheap goods for consumers, trade, investment and infrastructure. For the authors, 
the central benefit of Chinese engagement is its nature. They argue that while the West maintains 
asymmetric relationships reminiscent of colonialism, Chinese leaders offer Africans a relationship based 
on equality and partnership.33 
 He Wenping, the director of the Africa Studies program at the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (CASS), also highlights the positive nature of the Sino-African relationship. She claims the 
Sino-African relationship is “based more on the principles of sustainability and mutual benefit, rather than 
charity, [Chinese] aid projects are both stable and inherently equal, whereby China’s aid to Africa is not 
one of “superior” providing for an “inferior” but rather one developing nation assisting another.”34  While 
briefly noting some of the problems in the relationship, He Wenping concludes that overall, China is 
“helping Africa help itself.”35 These positive scholars focus on the benefits, particularly economic, of 
Sino-African relations. However, they too fail to showcase other aspects of Chinese engagement and the 
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domestic connection to outward Chinese activity. Clearly, a vast difference exists in scholars’ evaluations 
of Sino-African relations. Each conveniently highlights the benefits or detriments, either wholly ignoring 
or only briefly recognizing detractions from their arguments.
 Serge Michel and Michel Beuret, French scholars, maintain a more balanced analysis, claiming 
that, “China has met Africa’s needs head on and at last established a sound basis for development.” They 
highlight the benefits of China’s infrastructure projects, as well as the positive impact China has had on 
Africa’s image. They conclude that ultimately the impact of Chinese engagement depends on African 
leaders.36 For African scholar Garth Le Pere, the quality and capability of African leaders will determine 
the impact of Chinese engagement. He contends that the West’s criticism of China is superfluous, stating, 
“The phobia over which Chinese engagement in Africa is perceived as a threat is largely a product of 
Western-inspired hypocrisy and arrogance.”37 Pere asserts that while there are areas for concern, clear 
benefits exist. He points out that Chinese engagement is not static, but dynamic and improving with 
experience.  Pere argues that African leaders must craft a China policy just as China has crafted an Africa 
policy.38 These scholars, while still failing to relate engagement to China’s domestic experiences, paint a 
more accurate picture of relations. Importantly, they focus on the role African leaders must take in 
ensuring development. 
 Deborah Brautigam, one of the foremost experts on Chinese development assistance, also 
highlights the dynamism of Chinese engagement. She explains that Sino-African activities are based on 
China’s its own development experience as a recipient of assistance. For her, these experiences are very 
influential in shaping China’s behavior and policies as a donor.39 Wenran Jiang, is more explicit than 
Brautigam in his assertion that China is exporting its development experience to Africa. For Jiang, 
China’s behavior is shaped by its experience as a recipient of assistance and the CCP’s own 
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developmental policies. He often takes a critical tone, highlighting the losses within Chinese society in 
exchange for economic growth. Like Le Pere, Michel and Beuret, Jiang argues that African leaders must 
understand China’s domestic situation and make measured decisions regarding Chinese assistance.40 
Brautigam and Jiang provide a comprehensive understanding of Chinese engagement, highlighting its 
historical influences, dynamic nature and relation to domestic realities in China. They are two 
underrepresented voices in China-Africa literature, forming a small minority that recognizes the close 
connection between the PRC’s outward and inward policies. 
 While Brautigam and Jiang serve as central influences in this research, they too fail to identify the 
influence of developmentalism in Sino-African engagement. Developmentalism, as defined by scholar 
Lin Chun, is the single-minded and reckless pursuit of growth.41 Chun, who does not study Sino-African 
relations, but rather serves as a development scholar, recounts the changes in the Chinese psyche due to 
thirty years of rapid development. The Chinese population now carries with them developmental attitudes 
focused on growth-at-all-costs. Chun describes how this developmentalism severely harms Chinese 
society and threatens future development.
 Following along Brautigam and Jiang’s underrepresented arguments, this research will highlight 
the connection between China’s development experience and outward activities. It will also attempt to 
relate Chun’s theories of Chinese developmentalism to Chinese engagement in Africa. By highlighting the 
relation between China’s domestic situation and its operations in Africa, this research seeks to provide 
further insight on the dynamic and complex nature of Chinese engagement in Africa. 
4. Methods
Case Selection
 The cases for this research were chosen because Zambia and Sudan are among China’s top trade 
partners in Sub-Saharan Africa. This research had two main goals. The foremost goal was to understand 
the relation between China’s developmental experience and the behavior of Chinese actors in Africa. The 
underlying goal was to gain a dynamic understanding of Chinese engagement and how it affects African 
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development. In order to reach these goals, I utilized diverse case studies. These studies represent the 
variance in Chinese engagement, highlighting differing host country contexts and the impact of national 
interests on engagement. The Zambian case is representative of a democratic country with a variety of 
political actors and active civil society participation. The Sudanese case is representative of an 
authoritarian government with a suppressed civil society. My choice of case studies was also pragmatic. I 
had to find cases that fit within my chosen period of 1995 to 2010 and that had a variety of primary and 
secondary sources. 
Approach and Research
 This research is structured by a general research question which seeks to understand how China’s 
domestic developmental experience influences engagement in Africa, and, consequently, how this 
engagement impacts African development. To answer this question, I took an issue-based, comparative 
approach. Using my contextual analysis, I identified primary externalities in China’s rapid development: 
labor exploitation, environmental degradation, corruption and inequality. Through the lens of these issues, 
I identified and analyzed the cases. Within each case, I sought to discover whether engagement supported 
common development and how engagement related to China’s domestic development. To complete this 
task, I engaged the methods of archival research, discourse analysis and process tracing. 
 While most of my sources were secondary sources from scholarly journals, I attempted to collect 
literature from a wide-spectrum of scholars with differing academic emphases and physical locations. My 
research on Zambia was primarily based on the fieldwork of previous scholars, with supplementary news 
articles and other documents. For the Sudanese case, I employed a wide variety of literature, including 
news articles, scientific articles and social science articles.
5. Contextual Analysis
The PRC’s Experience as An Aid Recipient
 
 China’s development assistance modalities across Africa and the rest of the developing world are 
greatly influenced by their own experience as an aid recipient. In the 1970s, China appeared like many 
African states today. Its economy was primarily agrarian and the Chinese landscape was well-endowed 
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with natural resources.42 Japan, similar to China today, was a rapidly developing state in need of natural 
resources to support its growth. Recognizing the complementarity within their economies, Japan and 
China engaged in a strategic donor-recipient relationship. Between 1973 and 1978, “Chinese officials 
signed seventy-four contracts with Japan to finance turn-key projects that would form the backbone of 
China’s modernization. All would be repaid in oil.”43 The engagement embodied a pattern now reflected 
in Chinese activities with African states: investment-for-resource swaps and compensatory trade.44 The 
former consisted of Japan offering China resource-backed concessional loans, largely for the construction 
of infrastructure projects such as mines and telecommunications systems. Over time, China paid the loans 
with the resources extracted via the newly constructed infrastructure. The later, compensatory trade, 
allowed Chinese companies to import needed equipment and machinery from Japanese companies, which 
they would pay back overtime with products produced on the equipment.  
 As Brautigam emphasizes, both China and Japan saw this relationship as beneficial to their 
national interests. Through Japanese assistance, China gained access to its natural resources, as well as 
infrastructure, technology, skills and equipment. This was perceived as a necessary step to modernize the 
country and boost their own production capacity. As time wore on, Western countries began to compete 
with Japan, providing China further basis for modernization through tied-aid projects.45 As a recipient, 
China used foreign assistance to strategically support its development. The Chinese State therefore frames 
its assistance with Africa through the historical lens of its own development support. The premise of 
mutual benefit still exists, but today China now fulfills the role of industrialized Japan and African states 
that of developmental China. 
It doesn’t Matter Whether it’s a Black Cat or White Cat, as Long as it Catches the Mouse
 The above quote, spoken by Deng Xiaoping, often called the father of contemporary China, 
referred to his emphasis on improving the Chinese economy regardless of ideology. Between the early 
developmental period discussed above and the current period, China experienced unprecedented 
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economic development. During this time, the Chinese economy gradually transformed from a highly-
regulated communist economy to a market-driven economy. Today, China’s approach to development is 
termed the “Beijing Consensus.” Originally coined by Joshua Cooper Ramo in 2004, the term can be 
summarized by five central components:
1. Incremental Reform: This refers to China’s gradual approach to economic reform. Rather than 
instituting grand economic reforms over the whole country, they often tested policies first at the 
provincial level, experimenting with reforms until finding those that produced the best economic 
results
2. Innovation and Experimentation: China’s economy is driven by constant innovation and 
experimentation, which promotes productivity and the competitiveness of Chinese firms
3. Export-Led Growth: China has become the “workshop of the world,” with its economic growth 
driven by the high-demand for exports to the rest of the world
4. State Capitalism: This highly ambiguous term basically means that while the prices of most goods 
in the Chinese economy are market-driven, many companies remain state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), providing them advantages within the economy
5. Authoritarianism: The Chinese government maintains highly concentrated and centralized power, 
easing the implementation of policies and suppressing dissent.46
Together, these form the “five central pillars” that drove China’s economic development. With the state 
facilitating constant innovation through technological, industrial and infrastructural investment, the 
Chinese economy liberalized and experienced rapid economic development.
 China underwent both positive and negative transformational changes due to its rapid 
development. The positive changes are well-known. From 1981 to 2005, poverty was reduced from 84 
percent to just 16 percent of the population, or a decline of 627 million people in real numbers.47 Over the 
past 30 years, GDP averaged an annual rate of 9.7 percent, reaching rates as high as 14 percent during the 
last decade.48 China attracts massive amounts of foreign direct investment, propelling its industries, 
technological innovation and productive forces. While the living standards of many Chinese citizens are 
still far from those of Norway or the United States, they are converging at a rapid rate. This provides 
increasing numbers of Chinese people the ability to clothe and feed themselves, and for some, the ability 
to purchase luxury goods. 
 While a great number of benefits have resulted from China’s rapid economic development, a 
wealth of less-publicized problems currently plague Chinese society. Lin Chun states that 
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developmentalism has been a longstanding problem in China, leading to “a retreat of public welfare 
provision for social security in the name of economic rationality and efficiency.”49 Wenran Jiang 
characterizes China’s modernization as:
Heavy industrialization, labour- and capital-intensive manufacturing industries, export-led growth, 
low labour cost and high environmental damage. By following such a development paradigm, 
China’s “miracle” growth of GDP has come with heavy price tags on wages, workers’ welfare, the 
eco-system and political reforms.50
China’s rapid economic growth comes at a high-cost to the livelihoods of Chinese citizens. The current 
Chinese development model decreases the quality of life for many Chinese citizens and threatens future 
development prospects. 
 Chun remarks that China’s development path has lead to “naked greed, ruthless competition, 
hysterical consumerism and the commodification of human values.” Although China’s industrialization 
improved the living standards of millions of Chinese citizens, winners and losers have emerged in the 
process. Observers are quick to note that China’s modernization vastly favors those in urban areas over 
rural, leaving rural residents with much of the environmental degradation and corruption and little of the 
economic benefit. While an increase in inequality during times of industrialization is common, the sharp 
variance among Chinese citizens is cause for concern. Official figures show urban Chinese earning on 
average 23 times more than their rural counterparts, a number that many believe is underreported.51 Li 
Shi, an expert on income distribution trends at Beijing Normal University, states that China’s GINI 
coefficient (which depicts income inequality with 0 equalling perfect equality and 1 representing perfect 
inequality) has deteriorated from 0.3 a quarter century ago to close to 0.5 today.52 This rapid increase in 
inequality does not bode well for the CCP domestically, driving up citizen grievances towards the 
government and threatening domestic stability. 
 The environmental degradation caused by China’s rapid industrialization is also cause for serious 
concern.  In 2007, China claimed 16 of the world’s 20 most polluted cities. Due to massive deforestation 
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and land degradation, a quarter of the country is now desert. It is reported that 90 percent of the aquifers 
in Chinese cities are polluted, threatening the health of countless Chinese citizens and leaving 700 million 
people with drinking water contaminated by animal and human waste.53 When the environmental impact 
of China’s modernization is accounted for, its astonishing economic growth looks anemic. Studies 
estimate that, “environmental degradation and pollution costs the Chinese economy between 8 percent 
and 12 percent GDP annually.”54 This environmental degradation threatens the health of the Chinese 
people and future economic prosperity. Considering that China’s modernization has been due to the 
exploitation of its natural environment, the future of Chinese development is extremely uncertain. 
 Moreover, the developmental attitudes in China have resulted in unrestrained business practices. 
Operating in the competitive and profit-driven domestic market, Chinese enterprises have little experience 
with corporate social responsibly or adherence to labor and environmental standards. The competitive 
domestic environment encourages corrupt behavior by Chinese firms. Even when officials in Beijing 
enact environmental laws, factory owners and local officials fail to enforce them.  Elizabeth Economy, a 
senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, has found that many factory owners prefer to pay the 
fines for pollution rather than make the costly upgrades required for environmentally-friendly 
infrastructure. For example, in a 2005 survey of 509 cities, only 23 percent of factories reported properly 
treating sewage.55 Most worrisome of all, the Chinese business community believes that environmental 
protection seriously decreases their profitability. A poll of Chinese companies found that only 18 percent 
thought they could excel economically while operating in an environmentally friendly manner.56 
Developmentalism has seeped into Chinese business practices, threatening the well-being of China’s 
environment for improved productivity and greater profits. 
 This competitive culture not only threatens the well-being of the environment, but also the well-
being of the worker. China’s lack of stringent labor standards and employers disregard for existing 
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standards have led to countless health problems, injuries, and work-related deaths.  By 2007, the 
cumulative number of confirmed pneumoconiosis cases, an occupational lung disease, was nearly 
630,000.57  A study reported that work related fatalities in China involved 7,046 worker fatalities during 
the 2-year period of 2001 to 2003. The most fatal events included collisions (25.6%), drownings (14.6%), 
and structural collapses (12.5%).58 Workers are consistently exposed to occupational hazards and 
exploitative labor practices.  
 The negative affects of China’s development strategies are of concern to the central Chinese 
government. In the past ten years, the central government has gradually enacted a variety of laws and 
regulations aimed at improving the domestic situation. However, a gap exists in regulation and 
enforcement. According to Lin Chun, “China suffers from institutional weaknesses in its legal and 
regulatory infrastructure.”59 The massive state bureaucracy often lends itself to miscommunication, lack 
of coordination and general confusion, thus debilitating it from enforcing regulation. Additionally, a 
schism exists between the central government and provincial or local governments. Officials at lower 
levels of governance are more likely to ignore central regulatory laws due to personal interests in public 
and private companies, preexisting provincial laws and a desire to support competitive companies within 
their region. Thomas Thompson of Foreign Affairs notes, “Many companies even invite local officials to 
become silent partners in their corporations in return for political protection.”60  Compounding 
enforcement problems further, the CCP’s distaste for public criticism, establishes an environment that 
alienates investigative journalists, civil society actors and whistleblowers. In other societies, these actors 
play a critical role in supporting regulatory enforcement. In China, they are censured. While the central 
government is increasingly aware of and concerned with the negative affects of China’s rapid 
development, enforcement of regulation remains lax. This perpetuates the societal problems caused by 
China’s rapid growth and development.
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 The domestic environment in China breeds a culture devoted to profit and efficiency above all 
else. Chinese development policies have supported economic development, but also fostered widespread 
developmentalism. This should be a serious concern for African leaders interested in replicating the 
Chinese development model. On a continent seriously threatened by environmental degradation and 
known for domestic instability and strife, exportation of the Chinese development model could have 
grave consequences on the well-being of Africans. China’s weak legal system, lack of regulation, culture 
of opacity and high-level of corruption leaves Chinese enterprises negligent concerning occupational 
standards, environmental protection and responsible corporate conduct.61 If Chinese enterprises operate in 
this manner domestically, there is little reason why their behavior would change in Africa unless pressure 
for change came from within the African State. Therefore, African leaders must be mindful to look 
beyond the CCP’s win-win rhetoric and maintain an active role in ensuring Chinese engagement benefits 
African societies. 
6. Case Studies
Chinese Labor Relations in Zambia’s Chambishi Copperbelt
 The trials and tribulations of China’s mining industry are infamous domestically. While the 
central government has implemented mining regulations, Chinese mining firms are notorious for ignoring 
such regulation and maintaining deplorable labor standards. This has resulted in an average of seven 
mining deaths per day in China.62  While many examples of China’s mining tribulations exist, an accident 
in 2009 caught worldwide attention due to its severity. Under the management of the state-owned 
enterprise Heilongjiang Longmei Mining Holding Group, Chinese miners were extracting coal one April 
day from the Xinxing mine in Northern China. Despite knowing for over an hour that gas levels in the 
mine shaft were five times the level required for evacuation, the SOE’s managers failed to evacuate their 
employees. This resulted in the unnecessary deaths of 104 Chinese miners.63 The managers’ conduct 
highlights their prioritization of productivity and profit over the well-being of their employees. Accidents 
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such as this are a common occurrence in China, leaving Chinese citizens concerned about the well-being 
of their compatriots in the mining industry.
 Many of the problems concerning China’s domestic mining industry have also been replicated in 
Zambian mining operations. Contemporary Zambia reflects characteristics similar to the Chinese State 
forty years ago. While the country has a wealth of natural resources including copper, zinc and cobalt, it 
lacks the investment, human capital, technology and infrastructure to fully access these resources.64 
Zambia is deficient in basic infrastructure such as roads, railways and electric power facilities. Muna 
Ndulo, an African scholar, notes that many Zambians lack the entrepreneurial experience, education and 
technical skills required to utilize their natural resources and mobilize the economy.65 Fully recognizing 
Zambia’s wealth of minerals and development potential, the Chinese State provides considerable 
development assistance to Zambia. Their partnership reflects China’s pragmatic and business focused 
approach to relations abroad. Chinese investments have financed the construction of copper smelters, 
powers stations, factories and hospitals.66 Additionally, Zambia houses two Special Economic Zones 
similar to those located in China. In exchange for these investments, China maintains a steady supply of 
Zambia’s copper and other resources while also maintaining a strong presence in the country’s domestic 
markets. The arrangements between the two countries bear a strong similarity to China’s arrangements 
with Japan decades earlier. Each state offers the other opportunities necessary to their development. 
 The deals reached by PRC officials and their Zambian counterparts often include infrastructure 
and construction projects. Under the requirements of Eximbank, Chinese SOEs are rewarded the contracts 
for such projects. China Non-Ferrous Africa Mining, PLC (NFC-Africa) receives many Zambian 
contracts related to the mining industry.67 In 1998, NFC-Africa began operating in Zambia’s Chambishi 
Copperbelt with assistance from China’s Eximbank. Their first major investment included the 
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resuscitation of a copper mine that had been closed for over ten years.68 The firm bought an 85 percent 
stake in the mine for US$20 million, investing an additional US$130 million to modernize infrastructure 
and begin operations.69 Initially, Zambians were hopeful about the prospects of these new investors. 
Chinese investment supported employment, increased tax revenue for the government and provided an 
overall boost to the struggling economy.
 Despite initial enthusiasm, a number of grievances accrued between the Zambian workers and 
their Chinese managers. One source of conflict concerned hiring practices. Reminiscent of domestic 
hiring practices, NFC-Africa hired the highest proportion of casual workers (also known as informal or 
non-contract workers) of all the foreign firms operating in the Copperbelt. Out of the 2,063 employees 
hired by NFC, only 56 had permanent contracts.70 These casual workers did not receive work-related 
benefits or the job security of a permanent contract. Further frustrating the Chambishi community, the 
company subcontracted out parts of its operations. This provided little opportunity for the skill transfer 
opportunities boasted about by Chinese and Zambian politicians. Moreover, Zambian workers repeatedly 
complained about labor conditions at NFC-Africa, which they considered unsafe and exploitative. NFC-
Africa’s business conduct in Zambia demonstrated a similarity to the practices of domestic Chinese 
mining firms. Whereas domestically workers have been conditioned to accept these standards as the costs 
of development, unconditioned Zambian workers found Chinese business conduct unacceptable. 
 Recently, Human Rights Watch (HRW) published a report concerning NFC’s operations. While 
recognizing the investment and job creation the firm spurs, HRW concluded that NFC’s employees 
“suffer abusive employment conditions that fail to meet domestic and international standards.”71 Through 
interviews, the report found that miners endured poor ventilation, excessive working hours, lack of 
potable water, lack of protective equipment and threat of being fired for refusing to work in unsafe 
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environments.72 The report identified managers’ developmental attitudes and disregard for regulation, 
stating that managers found regulations to be “more of an imposition than an important component of a 
well-run copper mining operation.”73 Recognizing the connection to China’s domestic business conduct, 
Human Rights Watch concluded, “Some issues in Zambia [are] strikingly similar to safety and labor 
problems that plague China’s domestic mining industry.”74
 ULCA professor Ching Kwan Lee conducted fieldwork on Chinese-Zambian labor relations. In 
Ching Kwan Lee’s interviews with managers, the scholar found that the managers’ business modalities 
were based on their domestic experiences transitioning from a state-run to market economy. She states, 
For the Chinese managers, adopting a casual employment system was a natural response to the 
political and economic circumstances in both China and Africa. China’s own state-owned 
enterprise reform had smashed the “iron rice bowl” and stripped enterprises of all welfare 
functions...Chinese managers [are] convinced by reform at home that China and they know the 
way to break out of poverty and underdevelopment.75 
Lee recognized “a gap between what managers call work ethics and workers call exploitation.”76 
Managers recall the hard work and sacrifices made during the Chinese development process. They justify 
high demands on workers and strenuous work conditions as a necessary condition for the firm’s success 
and Zambia’s development. This directly conflicts with Zambia’s post-independence experience. During 
this period, high labor standards were established to protect Zambians from foreign exploitation.77 For 
Zambians, the conditions Chinese managers imposed upon them did not equate with development, they 
equated with exploitation. 
 The frustrations surrounding work conditions were compounded by workers’ knowledge of 
growing copper prices. From 2001 to 2006, prices rose from $1,400 a ton to about $7,000 a ton.78 As 
workers failed to see their incomes rise, they watched Chinese employees live comfortably, “Whereas 
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around a thousand Chinese workers lived in comfortable, well supplied camps, the locals has to make do 
with corrugated-iron shacks.”79 This gap in living standards further angered NFC’s employees. 
! Due to the proliferating list of grievances, Zambia’s powerful unions forced NFC-Africa into 
negotiations in 2004.80 Union leaders advocated for improved contractual terms, increased wages and 
adherence to occupational safety standards. Throughout the negotiation process, union leaders felt as if 
the Chinese management was stalling to come to a compromise. “I’ve never seen such difficult 
negotiations,” said Agnes Bwalya, a union leader and member of the Chambishi City Council, “The 
Chinese like to keep changing the make-up of the delegation. It’s a stalling tactic...and if they start to feel 
put upon, then they just lay off a load of people and turn to non-unionized temporary workers”81 Just as 
domestic managers thwart regulations and avoid improvements in operations, managers in Zambia 
attempted to circumvent union demands. 
 The attitude of Zambia’s central government emboldened Chinese managers to remain 
unresponsive to local demands. French scholars Serge Michel and Michel Beuret noted during the 
negotiations, “The Zambian government, like its police force, has given its full support to the Chinese and 
their business interests.” After one set of protests against the Chinese, then President Levy Mwanawasa 
chided his people, stating,
You people of Chambishi should know better. This mine here was run by a South African 
company which failed. The Chinese came and you have seen what is happening. Don’t be cheated 
to lose your employment, because your children will suffer.82 
With such high-level government support, Chinese managers initially felt their long-term business 
interests in Zambia were secure regardless of employee satisfaction.
 Frustrated by the protracted state of negotiations and lack of government support, conflict between 
NFC-Africa and the surrounding Zambian community reached new heights in the April of 2005. Failing 
to follow safety regulations, NFC’s BGRIMM explosives plant exploded, killing fifty-two Zambian 
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employees.83 The lack of occupational safety standards at BGRIMM was well-known before the 
explosion. An account of the conditions by Serge Michel and Michel Beuret depict the difficult and 
dangerous working conditions previous to the explosion:
The workforce was selected, if that is the word, from a crowd that would gather outside the plant’s 
gates each morning. None of the chosen few had any training in handling dangerous materials and 
fifty of them were crammed into a workshop designed to accommodate fewer than one-third that 
number. The workers were not made to surrender their cigarettes, lighters, or cell phones on their 
way in, and most important, there were no separate areas for those making dynamite and those 
making detonators.84
 Quickly becoming the largest mining accident in Zambia’s recent history, the story of the explosion 
spread throughout Zambia. Nationalist arguments to expel China from Zambia seeped into the country’s 
political discourse, with presidential candidate Micheal Sata calling for Zambians to reclaim their country 
from foreign “infesters.”85 While President Mwanawasa continued to support Chinese activities, large 
sectors of Zambian society turned critical of both NFC and the Chinese State.  Although Sata lost the 
election in 2006, his anti-Chinese position helped him gain considerable support with working-class 
Zambians and those sympathetic to their struggles. The explosion at BGRIMM served as a formative 
event in Sino-Zambian relations, bringing anti-Chinese sentiment into mainstream Zambian society. 
 Within this toxic climate, workers went on strike in the April of 2006.  Furious with their labor 
conditions and low wages, they gathered by the front gate of NFC one morning, calling for increased pay 
and improved standards.86 Throughout the day, employees, family members and community members 
gathered in protest. The crowd grew increasingly angry, eventually exploding into violence:
Workers burned the trucks loaded with copper, trashing paper documents in the offices, and even 
attacked the China house on the edge of Chambishi township. The Zambian police used rubber 
bullets and one miner was shot in the leg. Workers also blocked the main road to Chingola and set 
logs on fire to prevent passage.87
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The violent strike, paired with increasing anti-Chinese sentiment throughout Zambia, caused NFC to 
realize their precarious position. Fearing their business prospects threatened, the Chinese managers finally 
produced concessions. In 2007, NFC raised wages by 23 percent, casual or short-term jobs were 
converted to permanent positions and employee benefits increased.88 Looking back on the protest, a union 
leader involved in the collective bargaining agreement stated, “It was this strike that has put fear among 
the Chinese...It was illegal but it was necessary because it was the quickest way to achieve our goal.”89
 CCP action following the protests suggests that anti-Chinese sentiment caused Chinese officials 
great concern. Recognizing that the sentiments could damage China’s reputation and future acquisition of 
Zambian minerals, the Chinese State issued a number of guidelines aimed at improving the conduct of 
Chinese firms abroad. In August 2006, just months after the Zambian protest, China’s Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM) issued recommendations aimed at improving the safety of workers in overseas 
investments. The guidelines suggested Chinese firms hire more locals, respect local customs and respect 
international standards.90 The same year, the Chinese State Council, one of the most powerful government 
organs in the PRC, published nine directives to improve corporate social responsibility abroad.91 
Continuing this trend, in 2007 MOFCOM requested that the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
(OECD) explain their Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises to Chinese companies. The guidelines 
outline proper conduct for enterprises abroad and suggest means to improve corporate social 
responsibility programs.92 These guidelines imply that the Chinese State was concerned with the 
consequences of improper SOE conduct abroad. 
 The relationship between PRC officials and NFC-Africa is complex and opaque. The enterprise 
acts as market-driven and profit seeking venture. However, as an SOE, it often relies on the State to help 
finance operations abroad and obtain contracts. One can therefore surmise that PRC officials had 
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considerable influence over NFC’s change in behavior. Following MOFCOM’s recommendations and the 
State Council’s directives, NFC-Africa established a corporate social responsibility program in 
Chambishi. The program entailed renovations of a local hospital, road repairs, construction of public 
recreation facilities and donations to Zambian education and women’s empowerment programs.93 NFC’s 
collective agreement and corporate social responsibility programs, following the State’s guidelines and 
directives, suggests that the Chinese State influenced NFC to improve its conduct in Zambia.
 Relations between NFC-Africa and the Chambishi community have steadily improved, though 
labor disputes continue. Illustrating the complexity of the situation in Zambia, Zambian employees 
convey mixed feelings when speaking of their managers:
The thing I like about the Chinese is that if a Chinese is not designated as a boss, they will bring 
him down to work with us and they will not discriminate in his favor because he is a Chinese. He 
will do the same job as everyone else.94
There was massive unemployment in Chambishi...But with the coming of the Chinese you find 
that almost everybody, as long as he can work, is now employed in the Chinese mines. So we are 
happy...the Chinese are able to give us at least an income to feed and keep our children. Before the 
Chinese came people would just be loitering on the streets while some would go into the plant to 
steal things like cables and scrap metals but those are things of the past. So despite the poor 
conditions being offered we appreciate what the Chinese are doing.95
Although many Zambians still believe labor relations require improvement, they also recognize the 
opportunities China presents for Zambian development. It is interesting to note that in 2011, after four 
attempts, Michael Sata won the Zambian presidency. While many believe his election was a referendum 
on China, in his most recent campaign Sata toned-down his anti-Chinese platform and declared that he 
would take a pragmatic approach to Sino-Zambian relations. With this new campaign position, he finally 
won the election.96
 The Zambian case provides insight into the complexity of Chinese engagement in Africa. The 
statements relayed by Chinese managers confirm the externalization of developmental attitudes to Africa. 
For the managers, strenuous working conditions were critical to China’s rapid development and continued 
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prosperity. Living through this development period, they were confident they understood the necessary 
conditions to achieve growth and development. Judging by the labor conditions described by Michel and 
Beuret and reported by Human Rights Watch, the managers made little effort to heed Zambian or 
international labor standards. This lack of respect for regulation is also derived from the China’s business 
culture, which places little value on occupational regulation. The conduct of NFC’s managers prior to the 
violent protests was clearly influenced by the manager’s domestic experiences. They carried with them 
the developmental attitudes present in Chinese society and were confident that they understood what is 
required of a population to spur development. 
 The case also highlight the role of the Chinese State. Through government deals akin to those of 
Japan and China decades before, the Chinese State facilitated NFC’s entry into Africa. While operating in 
Zambia, NFC-Africa appeared to operate independently of the government. However, once public outrage 
over labor regulations threatened China’s reputation, future business ventures and the supply of natural 
resources, the government appears to have taken an active role in Sino-Zambian affairs. Just as the central 
government has issued regulations and guidelines to improve business operations domestically, the PRC 
issued guidelines to improve SOE operations abroad. While it is unclear to what extent the state 
influenced NFC-Africa’s implementation of a corporate social responsibility program, the timing of the 
events suggests the state played an influential role. It seems that when the conduct of Chinese nationals 
and enterprises threatens Chinese national interests in Africa, the Chinese State will take an active role in 
improving their conduct and repairing China’s reputation. 
Degradation, Dislocation and Complicity at the Merowe Dam
 Chinese firms have became world leaders in dam construction due to domestic energy demands. 
The Three Gorges Dam along the Yangtze River serves as a symbol of China’s developmental progress 
and dam construction abilities. A dream of Chinese leaders even before the creation of the PRC, it was 
viewed by the Chinese communist party as a means to both propel economic development and decrease 
China’s reliance on coal-fired power plants.97 The 17-year construction project reached completion in 
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2006. The dam has a total capacity of 18,200 megawatts, providing the energy of ten modern nuclear 
reactors.98 Throughout the construction process and since its completion, however, a multitude of 
problems surfaced, casting a shadow on the behemoth project. 
 Increased electric capacity has come at the cost of the region’s ecosystem and environment. 
Before beginning construction of the dam in 1994, Chinese specialists performed an Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) to identify possible environmental risks associated with the dam. While the 
assessment recognized negative environmental impacts, the Chinese specialists concluded that the 
impacts would largely be mitigated with the appropriate precautions.99 This has not been the case. The 
specialists either failed to predict or chose not to report much of the dam’s environmental damage. Where 
they did identify possible environmental degradation, they underestimated its severity. Erosion, water 
degradation, sediment load and loss of biodiversity have all been problems associated with the project.100 
The dam places substantial pressure on the coastal areas and threatens the agricultural productivity of the 
land. According to scientists from the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), about “172 million tons of 
sediment was trapped annually by the TGD in 2003-2008.”  This threatens the ecosystem and local 
residents, increasing the likelihood of dangerous floods. The dam also threatens the biodiversity of the 
ecologically rich region. Changing river flows and the structure itself have disrupted the natural habitats 
of many species. It is believed that the dam project, in conjunction with increasing levels of pollutants in 
the Yangtze, has caused the near distinction of five aquatic mammals including the rare Chinese River 
Dolphin.101 Additionally, hundreds of geological events have occurred since construction began, leading 
many to fear future destructive earthquakes around the Yangtze.102 
 The dam poses serious challenges to residents of the affected area along with environmental 
challenges. The Three Gorges project has submerged 13 cities, 140 towns and 1,350 villages.103 It is 
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estimated that 1.3 million people were forcibly displaced by the project.104 For residents in the Yangtze 
region, displacement has often been synonymous with a decrease in living standards. Many of the 
resettled rely on their natural environment to supply their economic means. According to the CAS study, 
the construction of the Three Gorges Dam has continuously reduced cropland, woodland, and grassland 
areas from 1977 to 2005.105 Many residents once prosperous along the Yangtze now live on small plots of 
less arable land, which do not provide the same economic opportunities as their former living spaces. 
 According to International Rivers, an NGO that diligently researches and reports on the project, 
compensation for the displaced has been inadequate. Local residents received no compensation for their 
land since it is technically owned by the Chinese State. While economic compensation was offered, many 
residents claim it has often been inadequate to purchase a new home or move to a more prosperous 
region.106 Xu Yuming, a researcher for the Chingqing government, stated in 2007, 
Relocated people sacrificed a lot for the Three Gorges Dam and their living standards dropped. 
Now we are facing a challenge of how to improve their living standards. The quality of land is 
getting worse and worse...there are now more people than the land can sustain.107
While the dam does provide needed energy to thousands of Chinese citizens, many resettled 
residents do not feel the dam improved their lives. Instead, the dam ended their way of life, 
leaving them powerless and impoverished. 
 In conjunction with the construction massive dam projects throughout China, the Chinese 
hydropower industry has become highly prosperous. Currently, about 87,000 dams are in China.108 
During China’s transition to a market economy, it privatized the energy industry and forced firms to 
compete for market shares.109 After this transition, Chinese hydropower enterprises began moving 
operations overseas in compliance with the “Going Global” policy. Developing countries see Three 
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Gorges as a symbol of China’s expertise. Consequently, a high demand exists for Chinese hydroelectric 
projects abroad. According to International Rivers, as of January 2012, Chinese companies are involved 
in approximately 300 projects in 66 countries.110 Among these overseas projects was the Merowe Dam 
project in Sudan.
 In the 1990s, the Sudanese government pursued funding from Canada, Malaysia, China, Arab and 
European countries for the Merowe Dam project. Most countries turned down Khartoum’s request, with 
France’s export credit agency COFACE publicly declining due to social and environmental concerns.111 
China’s Eximbank, which provides finance void of social and environmental conditions, responded to the 
request. In 2002, the bank provided a loan of $520 million, accounting for more than a quarter of the $2 
billion required for the project.112 The project was primarily constructed by CCMD Company, a 
consortium of the parastatals Sinohydro and China International Water and Electric Company. Merowe, 
which was completed in 2008, has a generation capacity of 1250 megawatts per hour and primarily serves 
the cities of Khartoum, Port Sudan, and Dongola.113 The facility provides a substantial boost to Sudan’s 
development and economic prospects by doubling the nation’s power-generation capabilities.114
 The Merowe project has been beset with controversy despite developmental benefits.  Many of 
the problems related to Three Gorges also plague the Merowe Dam. The 174 kilometer-long facility 
reportedly displaced between 50,000 to 70,000 people.115 In 2002, the official government resettlement 
plans promised resettled communities new homes, land, free utilities, free fertilizer and cash 
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compensation.116  Most of these entitlements have yet to be realized. Rather, the affected Sudanese tribes 
have been forcibly resettled from their fertile ancestral land, to cramped and infertile desert spaces. For 
many of the displaced, subsistence farming in the rich soil near the Nile had been way of life. Desert 
resettlement sites provided them little ability to continue this lifestyle. Village leaders at one site 
complained about this loss, citing a 65 percent increase in poverty in less than two years of 
resettlement.117 Many of the communities formerly located in the project area are experiencing a decrease 
in living standards similar to the hardships faced by residents resettled due to the Three Gorges Dam 
project.
 Environmental degradation reminiscent of Three Gorges also plagues the area around Merowe. In 
preparation for construction of the dam, Leymeyer International, a German consultancy firm financed 
through Khartoum, performed an Environmental Impact Assessment. The assessment, which was not 
made public prior to construction, concluded that all negative impacts of the dam could be mitigated.118 
This assessment allowed CCMD Company to begin construction on the Merowe project. However, 
following increased criticism of the project, two independent groups performed assessments.
 An independent assessment by the Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic Science and Technology 
determined that the Leymeyer’s assessment failed to comply with international EIA standards. In their 
assessment, they found that the Merowe Project entailed severe risks to the ecosystem and local residents. 
“Fluctuating water levels and sedimentation would have serious negative impacts on aquatic ecology, 
water quality and public health.”119 A UNEP assessment of the project supported these results, finding that  
Merowe negatively effected agricultural systems downstream, eroded the Nile riverbank, reduced 
groundwater recharge and blocked fish migrations.120 Many of the independent findings were not 
considered during the original EIA, bringing into question Leymeyer’s objectives and the independence 
of their assessment.
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 During construction, local residents repeatedly protested the Merowe project. This resulted in 
conflict between residents and Sudanese security forces. Ali Ashkouri, a human rights activist in Sudan, 
recalls protests against resettlement:
On Sept. 30th, a group of men, women, and children of Korgheli Village demonstrated against the 
dam around the dam site. The police ruthlessly attacked them using live bullets, tear gas and 
plastic rods. Three men were shot...on Dec. 1, the police again attacked the people of Korgheli 
village who refused to move and opted to stay in the ruins of their village house, which had been 
destroyed by the dam contractors. The police attacked them, dispersing them and eventually 
closing down the primary school and health centre to force them to move...121
Human rights abuses against local residents and nomads were a consistent element of Merowe’s 
construction process. Often, CCMD was complicit in these abuses.
 While the Chinese State and its SOE did not directly cause human rights abuses or fail to provide 
compensation packages, their support facilitated Khartoum’s actions against its citizens. Illustrating 
compliance with Khartoum’s abuses, the Chinese company operated in coordination with Sudanese 
security and armed forces.122 One example highlights the alliance of CCMD and the Sudanese State.
  In 2005, Chinese contractors prevented nomads, including women and children, from accessing 
water while they constructed electrical towers for the project. The firm stated that they needed the water 
for concrete works and their own consumption.123 After repeated confrontations with the nomads, the 
Chinese contractors called dam security forces to remove them. This caused the nomads to file complaints 
with a group called the Committee of the Affected People, who represented the interests of communities 
affected by the Merowe Dam.124 The Committee sent representatives to the area, resulting in a meeting 
between the Committee, representatives of CCMD company and Sudanese government representatives. 
Increasing hostilities and highlighting Khartoum’s use of violence and fear, the meeting was surrounded 
with “heavily armed army units.”125 This did not matter though, as the meeting quickly ended with no 
resolve. Dam representatives refused to consider to the nomads’ demands and left the meeting along with 
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CCMD’s representatives. Reporting on the incident, a Sudanese journalist remarked, “The whole affected 
area is on the verge of explosion anytime into violence...behind the current escalations is the Chinese 
contractors.”126
 Recognizing the growing tensions in the region, international groups pressured China to act 
responsibly. In 2007, UN Special Rapporteur on adequate housing, Miloon Kothari, reported on the 
situation in Sudan. After accounting the human rights abuses affiliated with in the dam, such as the 
shooting of unarmed protestors and arbitrary arrests, she called upon all states invested in Merowe to 
ensure that the project did not lead to further violations. Kothari also called upon companies to halt 
activities until a proper assessment of the situation was made, and specifically requested that China ensure 
its companies “did not directly- or indirectly- negatively impact the human rights of the affected 
people.”127 
 Responding to international criticism, Yu Jiang, a spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
stated, 
China attaches great importance to the local people’s livelihood, takes the possible environment 
effect seriously and applies strict environment evaluation and standards...as for the Merowe Dam 
project mentioned by some groups, relevant Chinese enterprises won the bidding of the project 
and its completion will be conducive to local economic and social development as well as local 
people’s livelihood.128
Despite the call by UN Special Rapportuer Kothari, the Chinese company continued their operations 
under the protection of Sudanese armed forces until Merowe’s completion. The PRC supported the 
continued work of CCMD under the auspices of mutual benefit, maintaining close relations with 
Khartoum. 
 The Merowe Dam case provides further insight into Chinese engagement in Africa. It is yet 
another example of the Chinese exporting their development experience to Africa. China’s development 
has hinged on mega-provisions of energy through hydroelectric projects. Believing in the relation 
between dams and development and searching for locations overseas to expand operations, experienced 
Chinese firms such as CCMD Company apply the skills cultivated domestically to construct dams abroad. 
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In both the Three Gorges Dam and the Merowe Dam, the projects caused severe environmental 
degradation and a loss of livelihood for affected communities. Additionally, the development gains from 
the projects were not distributed equally. While increased energy benefitted the governments and those in 
urban areas, many of the affected peoples in both countries could not afford electricity or did not have 
access to the energy grid. Therefore, the proclaimed developmental gains were not realized for them, thus 
perpetuating inequality.   
 The projects also illustrate the developmental attitudes of the Chinese State and its SOEs. These 
Chinese actors believed that the developmental benefits of the project outweighed the costs. Dams 
substantially increase energy capacity. This increased capacity benefits firms, increasing their productivity 
and allowing them to operate for longer hours. The energy provided by the dams thus spurs economic 
growth. For the Chinese state and its SOEs, environmental degradation and dislocation are small costs to 
pay for increased economic growth. The statement by Yu Jiang highlights the CCP’s focus on 
development gains. While they argue that energy would benefit the affected peoples at both dam sites, 
that does not appear to be the case in either project. In the Merowe case, the developmental lens under 
which Chinese actors operate influenced their perceptions of the project and its future benefits for the 
Sudanese people.
 The Merowe case highlights the utility of China’s nonintervention policy as well. Considering 
Sudan’s wealth of oil, the Chinese government has a significant interest in maintaining strong government 
relations with Khartoum. Sudan accounts for about five percent of China’s oil imports. The Government 
of China has its largest overseas oil project in the country and has built a $700 million oil refinery. About 
half of China’s overseas oil comes from Sudan and in 2005, during the construction of the Merowe 
project, China purchased half of Sudan’s oil exports.129 Maintaining positive relations with Sudan is 
therefore central to Chinese resource security. 
 Rather than remaining neutral in Sudan’s domestic affairs, nonintervention allowed the Chinese 
government to maintain close relations with Khartoum. This changed Khartoum’s calculation concerning 
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the treatment of Sudanese citizens. Chinese support emboldened Khartoum to ignore international calls 
for peace and perpetuated violence against the Sudanese people. The dam itself interferes with domestic 
affairs, providing more power urban areas that support the Sudanese government than those in rural 
communities. During his congressional testimony in 2007, Eric Reeves stated, 
China’s commercial and capital investments in Sudan reflect no benign “alternative model” of 
engagement, no enlightened economic partnership, but a callous willingness to do business with 
the most corrupt and repressive regimes if the perceived benefits are great enough.130
Indeed, in the case of Merowe, the policy of nonintervention helped CCMD rationalize collusion with the 
Sudanese government and gain lucrative profits from its construction. 
 The commonalities between the Merowe Dam and the Three Gorges Dam yet again depict the 
connection between China’s domestic development and its outward engagement. The Merowe project 
caused similar degradation and dislocation as the Three Gorges project along the Yangtze. It also 
highlighted the role developmentalism plays in outward engagement, the influence of natural resources in 
Chinese State conduct and the efficacy of China’s nonintervention policy. 
7. Conclusions
 Sino-African relations are influenced by China’s experience as an aid recipient, the PRC’s own 
development strategies and the state’s national interests. As the case studies illustrate, Chinese operations 
in Africa are based on their development process and resulting developmental attitudes. The state’s 
relations in Zambia and Sudan both depict the influence of Japanese aid modalities on Chinese foreign 
affairs and donor strategies. Central to these strategies are the resource-for-infrastructure agreements that 
Japan and China utilized in decades past. The use of Chinese firms and materials to construct these 
infrastructure projects also imitates prior Japanese strategies aimed at promoting business overseas and 
securing natural resources. Chinese assistance reflects elements of the Beijing Consensus as well. The 
CCP takes a market-driven approach to development assistance, advocating that Chinese engagement 
support export-led growth through the transmission of capital, infrastructure, skills and technology. 
Chinese politicians argue that African leaders should embrace the market just as China did, allowing 
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Chinese investment and trade to spur growth and diversify African economies. Chinese modalities in 
Africa are unequivocally derived from their own development strategies. 
 As the case studies show, Chinese engagement is not only an externalization of China’s 
development strategies. Rather, it is an externalization of China’s entire development experience. The 
occupational safety problems, difficult labor relations, environmental degradation and dislocation 
recounted in the Zambian and Sudanese cases highlights the connection between China’s domestic 
problems and resulting issues in Africa. Exemplifying the developmentalism that permeates Chinese 
society, many Chinese actors take a “no pain, no gain” attitude towards development. They focus far more 
on the end goal rather than the means necessary to achieve these goals. Chinese managers in Zambia did 
not perceive the difficult labor conditions they imposed as labor exploitation. For them, difficult working 
conditions were associated with their experiences during China’s rapid development. This attitude was 
also expressed in Sudan. While the Chinese State and SOE were aware of the environmental and human 
costs related to the dam, they perceived these costs as necessary evils. For them, such evils were 
outweighed by the benefits of improved power generation capacity. The developmental attitudes resulting 
from China’s rapid development have altered how Chinese actors perceive and rationalize their activities 
domestically and in Africa. 
 The differing results of each case study provide insight into Chinese engagement and the role 
national interests play in such engagement. Critical national interests in Africa include the acquisition of 
natural resources, development of a positive reputation abroad, entrance of Chinese firms into African 
markets and the abolishment of Taiwanese-African relations. Zambia is a democratic country with an 
active civil society. Public outcry in the country seriously threatened China’s future acquisition of 
resources, Zambian political support and the prospects of Chinese companies in the country. NFC, too, 
feared that the Chinese backlash threatened their operations. Far from improving their behavior due to a 
concern for the Zambian workers, Chinese actors improved their conduct when they felt their interests in 
Zambia were jeopardized. 
 The Sudanese case provides a sharp contrast to Zambia’s example. Living under an authoritarian 
regime, the Sudanese people have little influence on the activities of their government. Whereas in 
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Zambia, an active civil society exists, civil society actors in Sudan are ignored or actively silenced. 
International criticism also failed to have a significant influence on China’s foreign affairs in Sudan. 
While the Chinese government cares about its reputation, national resource acquisition prevailed in this 
case. Sudanese oil is a vital energy source for China. Hence, maintaining positive relations with 
Khartoum was critical for China’s resource security. Altering the behavior of Chinese actors and joining 
in international criticism would have threatened China’s relationship with Khartoum and resource 
security. Therefore, Chinese behavior in Sudan remained static due to the CCP’s need for Sudanese oil. 
 In addition to highlighting the role of national interests in Chinese engagement, the case studies 
emphasize the priority Chinese actors place on government relations. Coming from a nation in which the 
State influences many aspects of society, Chinese actors prioritize government relations over relations 
with other interest groups. In Zambia, Chinese actors did not alter their behavior initially due to support 
from the Zambian government. It was only when an anti-Chinese presidential candidate gained popularity 
that the Chinese State and NFC-Africa changed their conduct for fear of damaged government relations. 
The Sudanese case shows the opposite. In Sudan, Chinese activities and behavior remained unchanged as 
Khartoum fully supported their operations. Throughout Africa, it is repeatedly seen that Chinese actors 
emphasize government relations and defer to official state positions. 
 Finally, this research brings into question who Chinese engagement supports. Within the China-
Africa policy and throughout official statements, one senses that Chinese engagement will help all 
Africans climb out of poverty. However, in both cases, Chinese activities helped certain sectors of society 
more than others. Within Zambia, working-class Zambians were exploited while those affiliated with the 
government and those invested in the mining industry benefited. In Sudan, impoverished Sudanese 
nomads and villagers were displaced and disenfranchised to the benefit of those in the Sudanese 
government and their supporters around Khartoum. It appears that Chinese engagement does not facilitate 
equitable development when looking beyond the case studies as well. China’s top trade partners include 
Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, Zambia and South Africa.131 Excluding South Africa, none of China’s main 
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partners fair well on traditional measures of human development. The other four states listed above all 
rank low on the UNDP’s Human Development Index.132 Despite the rhetoric, Chinese engagement has yet 
to fulfill the interests of many common Africans.  It appears that engagement generally supports those 
already in positions of power. Similar to China’s domestic situation, engagement has perpetuated 
inequality. Those at the lower-rungs of society bear the costs while those in higher-classes reap the 
benefits. 
 While the case studies depict the externalization of China’s domestic problems and the influence 
of national interests on Chinese behavior, Chinese engagement does offer some development prospects to 
African countries. For economist Jeffrey Sachs, Sub-Saharan Africa suffers from a handful of poverty 
traps that have prevented development. He asserts that five structural reasons explain why poverty is most  
persistent in the region: high transport costs and small market size, low-productivity agriculture, a very 
high disease burden, adverse geopolitics and slow diffusion of technology.133 Building upon Sach’s 
conclusions, Paul Collier also identifies lack of integration into the world economy as a major hindrance 
for Africa’s development.134 
 Chinese engagement addresses some of these issues. The vast amounts of FDI, loans and grants 
provide Africa more capital to support development. On a continent that is incredibly infrastructure-
deficient, China’s resource-for-infrastructure loans provide African states the infrastructure necessary to 
promote development. The UN coordinator in Sudan has stated, “China’s role in infrastructure cannot be 
underestimated. It is clear that building a transport grid and electricity grid is an area where Chinese 
expertise can make a big difference.”135 PRC development assistance through bilateral agreements, 
FOCAC agreements and multilateral institutions also addresses some of the gaps identified by Sachs. For 
instance, professional training opportunities, agricultural development centers, capacity-building 
measures and the provision of medical assistance all facilitate development. 
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 Increased trade and investment with China also integrates African companies and markets into the 
world economy. As Collier identified, this is extremely beneficial for African development. Most 
importantly, Chinese engagement in Africa is changing worldwide perceptions of the continent. Whereas 
in the past, the West has been quick to cast Africa as a corrupt, impoverished and conflict-stricken 
continent, Chinese actors recognize Africa’s recent economic growth and political stability. Since much of 
the world is currently looking to China, it has also witnessed China’s engagement in Africa and is in turn 
realizing the improved environment within Africa. Fearing a Chinese monopoly over African goods and 
markets, many states and companies are now looking to Africa in a new light and pursuing their own 
engagement. Chinese engagement has certainly benefitted African development by helping states 
integrate into the world economy, providing vital capital and infrastructure, and changing worldwide 
perceptions of the continent. 
 Despite potential benefits, it appears that African states are more likely to inherit the negative 
aspects of China’s development process rather than rapid economic growth and widespread poverty 
alleviation. Chinese discourse on Sino-African relations exaggerates the development opportunities the 
PRC provides to African states. Many African countries are not in the position China found itself in thirty 
years ago. China’s development has been based on the factor endowment in which it has a strong 
comparative advantage: labor. The sheer size of the population enabled China to become the factory of 
the world. While many African states are also well-endowed with cheap labor, they do not necessarily 
have the combination of infrastructure, technology and strong state policies to fully maximize the 
productivity of their labor forces. Absolutely critical to Chinese development, as noted by Justin Yifu Lin, 
Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank, was the ability of the Chinese State to 
facilitate development through strategic policies.136 Considering that many of China’s partners in Africa 
struggle with good governance and political stability, the ability of African states to adopt such state-
centered and well-organized macroeconomic policies is questionable. 
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 There is another caveat for African states following China’s export-led development model. As 
Paul Collier recounts in his book, the Bottom Billion, African manufacturing industries will have to 
compete with the manufacturing behemoth of China within the global economy.137 Whereas when China 
developed, there were few areas in the world with their manufacturing potential and cheap labor, African 
states will have to compete with the highly-efficient manufacturing industry in China. Compounding this 
problem, the current financial crisis has decreased the flow of outward investment by the developed world 
and decreased their ability to purchase goods from abroad. Africa’s development will likely be much more 
challenging and slower than that experienced by China. Unfortunately, because of the differing 
geopolitical and economic circumstances of today’s world, Africa’s development will be arduous no 
matter the development strategy employed. 
 Considering the challenges and opportunities Chinese engagement affords Africa, what can be 
done to improve the prospects of African development? Africans cannot rely on the Chinese government 
to improve the conduct of Chinese actors abroad. Domestically, the central government has instituted 
regulations to address problems within Chinese society. Regulation, however, has come too slowly and 
with little enforcement. Although it was seen in the Zambian case that the CCP instituted guidelines for 
actors abroad, Africans cannot be satisfied with such actions. Considering that the Chinese government 
implemented the “Going Global” policy in 1999, or seven years prior to issuing the guidelines for actors 
abroad, improving the behavior of actors does not appear to be a major priority. Moreover, they issued 
guidelines and directives rather than imposing enforceable regulations. No official requirements exist for 
the CCP to control the activities of Chinese actors abroad.
 The likelihood that the Chinese State will impose regulations aimed at supporting African 
development is even more unlikely due to national interests. This is especially the case when natural 
resources are involved. Although the Chinese State desires to assist the developing world, this desire is 
inferior to their need to fulfill development goals. National interests, which sometimes conflict with the 
stated goals of Sino-African cooperation, help explain the complexity and dynamism of Chinese 
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engagement. Considering China’s overwhelming need for resource security, it is highly unlikely the 
Chinese State will earnestly regulate its actors abroad when resources are involved.
 With the CCP unwilling or unable to protect Africans from the externalities of Chinese 
engagement, strong African leadership is critical to promoting comprehensive development. African 
leaders currently find themselves in a strategically powerful position due to China’s need for markets and 
resources. As the case studies illustrate, Chinese actors place the most esteem on government relations. 
Hence, public leaders are best positioned to reorient Chinese engagement towards African development 
goals. While examples of leaders asserting themselves against Chinese actors exist, more African leaders 
must look beyond China’s rhetoric of mutual benefit and maintain an active role in shaping Sino-African 
relations. Leaders should strive to gain an understanding of both the costs and benefits of China’s 
development experience, as well as China’s national interests. With such an understanding, leaders can 
craft policies that exploit possible benefits of Chinese engagement while mitigating possible problems.
 The above conclusions present an obvious problem. In some societies, public officials may be 
more concerned with capturing benefits for the ruling elite rather than for comprehensive development. In 
this case, the role of civil society, private leaders and regional organizations is crucial. While Chinese 
actors are not always responsive to civil society concerns, NGOs and other groups have power in their 
ability to publicize the negative ramifications of Chinese activities. Particularly within developing states, 
the CCP is deeply concerned with maintaining a positive and responsible reputation. Negative publicity 
threatens this reputation and may influence Chinese actors to improve engagement. Since Chinese 
activities are business-oriented, African private leaders also play an influential role in pressuring Chinese 
firms to operate in a manner conducive to development. These leaders can influence investment choices 
and promote adherence to occupational and environmental standards. Finally, while criticism from the 
international community does not always persuade Chinese actors to alter their behavior, criticism from 
African organizations would likely be effective. China needs Africa to fulfill its national interests and 
development trajectory. Positive relations with organizations such as the African Union and NEPAD are 
priorities for the Chinese State. Pressure from such organizations will likely be very effective in altering 
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engagement. Even in states where the interests of the people are not the interests of the ruling class, 
means exist to improve Chinese engagement in favor of development. 
 When studying China’s development experience, one finds that the State exploited relationships 
with more developed countries to fulfill its development needs and capture new opportunities. Just as 
China acts in its own interests, African actors must act in their own interests. As the economist Alexander 
Gershenkron asserted in the 1950s, developing states (referred to by Gershenkron as backwards) that 
develop later have the benefit of learning from the developmental processes of industrialized 
economies.138 Therefore, with knowledge of China’s development experience and the resulting societal 
problems, African leaders can learn from China’s development process and construct informed strategies 
to leverage Chinese engagement for the best developmental outcomes. 
 Sino-African relations are often asymmetrical, favoring Chinese actors more so than their African 
counterparts. However, with cognizance of China’s developmental experience, African leaders can 
rebalance Sino-African relations and realize the win-win outcomes discussed in the China-Africa policy. 
Africa is already threatened by many structural problems and cannot afford to inherit any of China’s 
development externalities. Chinese engagement does offer African states development opportunities. If 
African leaders navigate this engagement and learn from China’s domestic experience, then such 
engagement could seriously spur comprehensive African development. 
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